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ABSTRACT
Loyalty programs in the form of punch cards that can be redeemed
for benets have long been a ubiquitous element of the consumer
landscape. However, their increasingly popular digital equivalents,
while providing more convenience and beer bookkeeping, pose
a considerable risk to consumer privacy. is paper introduces a
privacy-preserving punch card protocol that allows rms to digitize
their loyalty programs without forcing customers to submit to
corporate surveillance. We also present a number of extensions
that allow our scheme to provide other privacy-preserving customer
loyalty features.
Compared to the best prior work, we achieve a 14× reduction in
the computation and a 25× reduction in communication required
to perform a “hole punch,” a 62× reduction in the communication
required to redeem a punch card, and a 394× reduction in the com-
putation time required to redeem a card. Much of our performance
improvement can be aributed to removing the reliance on pairings
present in prior work, which has only addressed this problem in the
context of more general loyalty systems. By tailoring our scheme
to punch cards and related loyalty systems, we demonstrate that
we can reduce communication and computation costs by orders of
magnitude.
1 INTRODUCTION
Punch cards that can be redeemed for rewards aer a number of
purchases are a widely-used incentive for customer loyalty. Al-
though these time-tested loyalty schemes remain popular, they
are increasingly being replaced with digital equivalents that reside
in mobile apps instead of physical wallets. e benets of going
digital for business owners include stronger defenses against coun-
terfeit cards, a more convenient customer experience, and beer
bookkeeping around the popularity and ecacy of their loyalty
program [11, 27].
Unfortunately, digital loyalty programs also introduce a myriad
new opportunities for customers’ privacy to be violated [11, 32],
e.g., by linking customer behavior across transactions. is kind
of tracking can be conducted by the business itself, a third-party
loyalty service, or a malicious actor who gains access in a data
breach. us any rm who wants to protect customer privacy
should aempt to ensure that its digital loyalty program does not
collect unnecessary data. But is it possible to digitize the traditional
punch card without damaging customer privacy?
One approach to this problem is via standard anonymous cre-
dential techniques [13, 14, 16]. Ecash systems [2, 12] or even the
uCentive system [34], which is specically designed for loyalty
programs, can be used to give a customer an unlinkable token for
each purchase. However, storage and computation costs to hold
and redeem a token in these systems must be linear in the number
of “hole punches” a customer acquires.
A recent line of work, beginning with the Black Box Accumula-
tion (BBA) of Jager and Rupp [29], removes this linear dependence
on the number of hole punches. Although individual hole punches
are unlinkable in the original BBA scheme, the processes of issuing
and redeeming a punch card are not. is shortcoming is rectied
in the later BBA+ and Updatabale Anonymous Credential Systems
(UACS) works by Hartung et al. [28] and Blomer et al. [5], as well
as the recent improvements of Bobolz et al. [6], all of which ad-
ditionally extend the idea of black box accumulation to support a
broader set of functionalities.
is work introduces new protocols specically designed to
support privacy-preserving digital punch cards. By focusing specif-
ically on the requirements of punch cards and similar points-based
loyalty programs, we are able to make both qualitative and quan-
titative improvements over prior work. Unlike the works listed
above, our main protocol does not rely on pairings, enabling sig-
nicant performance improvements. Moreover, by stepping away
from previous abstractions used for punch cards, we can handle
punch card issuance non-interactively, meaning that a customer
can generate a new, unpunched card without any interaction with
the server. As an ancillary benet, this removes a potential denial
of service opportunity in prior systems, where a customer could
register many punch cards without actually needing to earn any
punches.
In terms of performance, our scheme reduces the client side com-
putation required to generate a new punch card by 280× compared
to prior work (in addition to not requiring interaction with the
server), reduces the total client and server computation times to
perform a card punch by 14×, and reduces the time to redeem a
card by 394×. Communication costs to punch and redeem a card
are also reduced by 25× and 62×, respectively.
Our core protocol is quite simple. To generate a punch card, a
client picks a random secret and hashes it to a point in an elliptic
curve group using a hash function modeled as a random oracle [3,
21]. To receive a hole punch, the client masks this group element
and sends it to the server, who sends it back raised to a server-
side secret value, along with a proof that this was done honestly.
Finally, aer several punches, the client redeems the card by sending
the unmasked version along with the initial random secret to the
server. e server checks that the group element submied matches
the hash of the random secret raised to the appropriate exponent.
It also checks that the punch card being redeemed has not been
redeemed before. Since the server is not involved in card issuance
and only ever sees separately masked versions of the card, it cannot
link a redeemed card to any past transaction. We prove, in the
Algebraic Group Model (AGM) [23], that a malicious customer
cannot successfully claim more rewards that it is entitled to.
We also present a number of extensions to our main scheme that
allow us to handle variations on the typical punch card. For example,
we can handle special promotions where users get multiple punches,
programs where purchases receive a xed number of points instead
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of a single punch, and even private ticketing systems. Our most
involved extension allows customers to merge the points on two
punch cards without revealing anything to the server about the
individual punch cards being merged. is extension uses pairings,
but it still maintains the other advantages of our protocol and
outperforms prior work, albeit by a smaller margin.
Our schemes are implemented in Rust with an Android wrapper
for testing on mobile devices, and all our code and raw perfor-
mance data are open source at hps://github.com/SabaEskandarian/
PunchCard.
2 DESIGN GOALS
is section describes our goals for a punch card scheme. We give
security denitions and contrast the goals of our work with those
of closely related works.
2.1 Functionality Goals
A punch card scheme consists of three components. First, a client
running on a customer’s phone should be able to create a new
punch card. Next, the client and a server running a loyalty program
can interact in order for the server to give the client a “hole punch.”
Finally, a client can submit a completed punch card to the server
for verication, and the server will accept valid punch cards that
have not already been redeemed. e server keeps a database DB
of previously redeemed cards to make sure a client doesn’t redeem
the same card multiple times. Aer verifying a card, the server can
give the client some out-of-band reward. In general, each of these
steps can be a multi-round interactive protocol between the two
parties. However, since all our protocols involve exactly one round,
we present the syntax of a punch card scheme below as consisting
of individual algoriths instead of interactive protocols.
A punch card scheme dened with respect to a security parameter
λ is dened as follows.
• ServerSetup(1λ) → sk, pk,DB: On input a security pa-
rameter λ, the initial server setup produces server public
and secret keys, as well as an empty database to record
previously redeemed punch cards.
• Issue(1λ) → psk,p: On input a security parameter λ, the
Issue algorithm generates new punch card p and a punch
card secret psk.
• ServerPunch(sk, pk,p) → p′,pi : On input the server keys
and a punch card, ServerPunch outputs an updated punch
card p′ and a proof pi that the punch card p was updated
correctly.
• ClientPunch(pk, psk,p,p′,pi ) → psk′,p′′or⊥: Given the
public key, a punch card secret psk, the accompanying
punch card p, a server-updated punch card value p′, and a
proof pi , ClientPunch outputs an updated secret psk′ and
card p′′ if the proof pi is accepted and ⊥ otherwise.
• ClientRedeem(psk,p) → psk′,p′: Given a punch
card secret psk and the corresponding punch card p,
ClientRedeem outputs an updated secret psk′ and card
p′ that are ready to be sent to the server for redemption.
• ServerVerify(sk, pk,DB, psk,p,n) → 1/0,DB′: on input
the server keys, redeemed card database, a punch card, the
accompanying secret, and an integern ∈ Z determining the
required number of punches for redemption, ServerVerify
outputs a bit determing whether or not the punch card is
accepted and an updated database DB′.
Correctness for a punch card scheme is dened in a straightfor-
ward way. An honestly generated punch card that has received
n punches should be accepted by an honest server. is should
hold true even aer many punch cards have been generated and
redeemed.
Denition 2.1 (Correctness). We say that a punch card scheme is
correct if for
sk, pk,DB0 ← ServerSetup(1λ)
and anyn ∈ Z, the following set of operations, repeated sequentially
N = poly(λ) times, results in bj = 1 for all j ∈ [N ] with all but
negligible probability in λ.
(psk0,p0) ← Issue(1λ)
for i ∈ [n] :
p′i ,pii ← ServerPunch(sk, pk,pi )
pski+1,pi+1 ← ClientPunch(pk, pski ,pi ,p′i ,pii )
psk,p ← ClientRedeem(pskn ,pn )
bj ,DBj+1 ← ServerVerify(sk, pk,DBj , psk,p,n)
e functionality we desire from our punch cards is at a high level
similar to that oered by black box accumulation (BBA) [29]. Al-
though we oer a similar functionality, we will do so with stronger
security guarantees and signicantly improved performance. On
the other hand, BBA+ [28], UACS [5], and Bobolz et al. [6] oer
additional features that might be useful in other kinds of loyalty
programs, such as reducing balances and partially spending ac-
crued rewards. ese features enable other applications, but, as
described in Section 1, they render the solutions less eective for
the original punch card problem. Bobolz et al. introduce the pos-
sibility of recovering from a partially completed spend that gets
interrupted mid-protocol, e.g., due to a communication or hardware
fault. Our scheme avoids the potential for this problem entirely
because redemption only requires a single message from the client
to the server.
One way in which our seing diers fundamentally that of BBA+,
UACS, and Bobolz et al. is the way in which we prevent a punch
card from being redeemed more than once. In our seing, the server
has access to a database of all previously redeemed cards when
deciding whether or not to accept a new punch card submied
for verication. BBA+, UACS, and Bobolz et al. consider an oine
double spending scenario where the server may not have access
to such a database but must be able to identify clients who have
double spent punch cards aer the fact. We do not pursue this goal
for three reasons, listed in order of increasing importance below.
(1) Not necessary: point-of-sale terminals oen require an
internet connection to work, so synchronizing spent punch
cards between dierent locations of a rm with multiple
branches can happen online with less performance cost
than an oine verication approach.
(2) Prohibitively expensive: the performance cost of checking
whether a punch card was double spent in prior work is
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REALPRIV(λ,A):
1. T ← {}
2. c ← 0
3. (sk, pk) ← A1(λ)
4. b ← AOissue,Opunch,Oredeem2 (λ)
5. Output b
e experiment REALPRIV(λ,A) makes use of the following ora-
cles, which have access to shared state T keeping track of issued
punch cards and the public key pk, subject to the restriction that
Oredeem is only called once on each input id.
Oissue(λ):
1. psk,p ← Issue(1λ)
2. T [c] ← (psk,p)
3. c ← c + 1
4. Output c,p
Opunch(id,p′,pi ):
1. if id < T , output ⊥
2. (psk,p) ← T [id]
3. (psk′,p′′) ← ClientPunch(pk, psk,p,p′,pi )
4. if (psk′,p′′) , ⊥, then T [id] ← (psk′,p′′)
5. Output p′′
Oredeem(id):
1. if id < T , output ⊥
2. (psk,p) ← T [id]
3. psk′,p′ ← ClientRedeem(psk,p)
4. Output psk′,p′
Figure 1: Real privacy experiment
prohibitive, requiring at least one exponentiation for each
previously redeemed punch card. is would be about 8
orders of magnitude slower than the hash table lookup
required in our seing (as measured on our evaluation
setup).
(3) Requires real-world identity: identifying the human user
who double spent a punch card in a way that the person can
be penalized requires some notion of real-world identity
tied to the punch card client. is means that any loyalty
system providing such a feature would require a user’s real-
world identity in order to operate. is violates our original
goal of making a punch card loyalty program digital with
no damage to user privacy.
2.2 Security Goals
At a high level, a punch card scheme must provide two kinds of
security guarantees. First, it must protect client privacy such that
the server learns nothing from messages sent by the client. Second,
it must be sound in that no client can redeem more rewards than
it has honestly accrued through valid hole punches authorized by
the server.
We dene privacy using a simulation-based denition. is
means that in order for privacy to be satised, there must exist a
simulator algorithm that can generate the view of the punch card
server without access to client-side secrets. Informally, if the server
can’t distinguish between the output of the simulator and a real
IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S):
1. T ← {}
2. c ← 0
3. (sk, pk) ← A1(λ)
4. b ← AOissue,Opunch,Oredeem2 (λ)
5. Output b
e experiment IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S) makes use of the following
oracles, which have access to shared stateT keeping track of issued
punch cards, the public key pk, and S = (S1,S2,S3), subject to the
restriction that Oredeem is only called once on each input id.
Oissue(λ):
1. p ← S1(1λ)
2. T [c] ← (0,p)
3. c ← c + 1
4. Output c,p
Opunch(id,p′,pi ):
1. if id < T , output ⊥
2. (cid,p) ← T [id]
3. p′′ ← S2(pk,p,p′,pi )
4. if p′′ , ⊥, then T [id] ← (cid + 1,p′′)
5. Output p′′
Oredeem(id):
1. if id < T , output ⊥
2. (cid,p) ← T [id]
3. psk′,p′ ← S3(sk, cid)
4. Output psk′,p′
Figure 2: Ideal privacy experiment
client, then it surely can’t learn anything from interacting with a
real client because it could have received the same information by
running the simulator on its own.
Our privacy denition denes real and ideal privacy experiments,
both of which begin with the challenger initializing an empty table
T mapping unique integer identiers to punch cards and a counter
c ← 0 that is incremented each time a new punch card is issued. e
adversary is allowed to pick server secret and public keys (sk, pk),
and then it is allowed to interact with oracles Oissue, Opunch, and
Oredeem which play the role of the client in the punch card scheme.
In the real privacy experiment, these oracles act as wrappers around
the Issue,ClientPunch, andClientRedeem functions, simply calling
the functions on the requested punch card (identied by an id
number chosen at issuance) and performing bookkeeping when
punch cards are issued, updated, or redeemed. e ideal privacy
experiment replaces each of these functions with calls to simulator
algorithms S1, S2, and S3 which have no access to punch card
secrets. At the end of each experiment, the adversary outputs a
distinguishing bit b.
Denition 2.2 (Privacy). Let Π be a punch card scheme. en
for a security parameter λ, and for every adversary A made up
of algorithms A1 and A2, there exists a simulator S made up of
algorithms S1, S2, and S3 such that the outputs of the experiments
REALPRIV(λ,A) (Figure 1) and IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S) (Figure 2) are
computationally indistinguisable.
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SOUND(λ,A):
1. sk, pk,DB← ServerSetup(1λ)
2. cpunch ← 0
3. credeem ← 0
3. AOpunch,Oredeem (λ, pk)
4. if credeem > cpunch, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
e experiment SOUND(λ,A) makes use of the following oracles,
which all have access to the shared state cpunch, credeem, sk, pk,DB.
Opunch(p):
1. p′,pi ← ServerPunch(sk, pk,p)
2. cpunch ← cpunch + 1
3. Output (p′,pi )
Oredeem(psk,p,n):
1. b,DB′ ← ServerVerify(sk, pk,DB, psk,p,n)
2. if b = 1:
3. credeem ← credeem + n
4. DB← DB′
5. Output b
Figure 3: Soundness experiment
In particular, we say that a punch card scheme Π has privacy if
there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any ecient
adversary A, we havePr[REALPRIV(λ,A) = 1]
− Pr[IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S) = 1]  < negl(λ).
Our soundness denition resembles that of BBA [29], which
requires that a malicious client can only redeem as many punches
as it has accrued. Aside from modifying the syntax of the denition
to match our own, we have also modied it to allow the adversary
to interleave hole punches and redemptions instead of requiring
that all redemptions occur at the end of the protocol.
Denition 2.3 (Soundness). Let Π be a punch card scheme. en
for a security parameter λ and adversary A, we dene the sound-
ness experiment SOUND(λ,A) in Figure 3. We say that a punch
card scheme Π satises soundness if there exists a negligible func-
tion negl(·) such that for any ecient adversary A, we have
Pr[SOUND(λ,A) = 1] < negl(λ).
As in BBA, this denition does not capture whether or not a
client can transfer value from one punch card to another or merge
separate, partially lled punch cards to redeem a single, larger
card. In fact, it is not entirely clear if this kind of card merging
is a malicious behavior to be avoided or a benecial feature to be
desired. is kind of merging appears to be dicult to do in our
main construction, but we show how to extend our scheme to allow
a limited degree of merging in Section 4.
3 PRIVACY-PRESERVING PUNCH CARDS
is section describes our main punch card scheme. In addition to
its quantitative improvements over prior work, which we measure
in Section 5, our scheme has a number of other desirable properties:
• Whereas all prior works make use of pairings, either be-
cause they rely on Groth-Sahai proofs [26] or Pointcheval-
Saunders signatures [36], our punch card scheme does not
require pairings.
• We require no communication at all to issue a new punch
card – a client can do this on its own without server involve-
ment. is removes a potential denial of service opportu-
nity present in prior work, where a client could initiate
a number of punch cards without making any purchases,
thereby making the server incur unnecessary storage and
computation at no cost to the malicious client.
• Our redemption process involves a client sending a sin-
gle message to the server, so there is no potential for the
process to be interrupted mid-protocol and no need for a
recovery process of the form proposed by Bobolz et al. [6].
3.1 Main Construction
A basic scheme. We will begin with a bare-bones version of our
scheme that provides neither privacy nor soundness. From this
starting point, we will gradually build up to our actual scheme.
roughout, we will work in a group G of prime order q.
To set up the initial scheme, the server chooses a secret sk ∈ Zq ,
and a client chooses a group element p0 ←R G to represent the
punch card. To receive a hole punch, the client sends pi to the
server, who returns pi+1 ← pski . To redeem a card aer n punches,
the client submits p0 and pn to the server, who accepts if pn = psk
n
0
and p0 has not been previously used in a redeemed card.
Adding privacy. e scheme above clearly provides no privacy
because the server can link the dierent times it sees a punch card.
We can make punches made on the same card unlinkable by only
sending the server masked versions of the punch card, in a way
reminiscent of standard oblivious PRF constructions [22, 35]. e
punch card is always masked with a fresh value m ←R Zq before
being sent to the server, so the server only sees p′ ← pm , not p
itself. e maskm is removed (via exponentiation by 1/m) before
the next mask is applied. is means that the server sees a dierent
random group element each time it punches a card. Moreover, an
honest server only sees a random group element p ∈ G and pskn at
redemption time.
Unfortunately, this does not actually suce to provide privacy
against an actively malicious server. Consider a malicious server
who always follows the scheme above, but during one hole punch
(for a client it later wishes to re-identify) it uses a dierent secret
sk′ ←R Zq so that sk , sk′ except with negligible probability. en
when an unsuspecting client aempts to redeem its punch card,
instead of submiing p,psk
n
, it really submits p,psk
n−1sk′ , allowing
the server to identify it.
We can handle the aack above by having the server give a zero
knowledge proof of knowledge that it has honestly punched a card.
To facilitate this, we require the server setup to also output a public
key pk ← дsk, for some publicly known generator д ∈ G. en
the server can prove at punching time that it is returning a punch
card p′ such that p′ = psk, i.e., that p, pk,p′ form a DDH tuple [20].
is can be proven eciently with a generic Chaum-Pedersen
proof [17] made non-interactive in the random oracle model [3, 21].
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e server generates the proof pi and sends it to the client along
with the punched card pi+1. e client rejects the updated card if
the proof does not verify. We denote proofs using the notation of
Camenisch and Stadler [15], where ZKPK{(sk), pk = дsk,p′ = psk}
represents the Chaum-Pedersen proof, and require the standard
zero knowledge and existential soundness properties [7].
Adding soundness. e two modications above ensure that the
scheme provides privacy, but it still fails to provide soundness,
as a malicious client can redeem more points than it has received
punches. Consider a client who at rst honestly follows the protocol
and redeems a punch card by submiing p0,pn . Next, it submits
a masked pn for another punch and gets back pn+1. Finally, it
submits p1,pn+1 as another valid punch card. According to the
scheme described thus far, the server would accept this punch
card redemption, meaning that the malicious client can redeem 2n
punches even though it only received n + 1 punches.
e aack above works because the client can choose any group
element it wants asp0. We modify our scheme to provide soundness
by forcing clients to generate p0 as the output of a hash function
modeled as a random oracle H : {0, 1}λ → G . In particular, instead
of choosing a random p0, the client chooses a random u ← {0, 1}λ
and sets p0 ← H (u). When redeeming a punch card, instead of
sending p0,pn , the client sends u,pn , and the server checks that
pn = H (u)skn . Since the hash function is modeled as a random
function, a malicious client cannot nd the preimage of a group
element under H , eliminating the aack.
With this defense, our scheme now provides both privacy and
soundness. We formalize our construction as follows.
Construction 1 (Punch Card Scheme). Let G be a group of prime
orderq with generatorд ∈ G , a letH be a hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ →
G, modeled as a random oracle.
We construct our punch card scheme as follows:
• ServerSetup(1λ) → sk, pk,DB: Select random sk ←R Zq
and set pk← дsk ∈ G . Initialize DB as an empty hash table,
and return sk, pk, and DB.
• Issue(1λ) → psk,p: First, select a random secret u ←R
{0, 1}λ and a random masking valuem ←R Zq . en com-
pute p ← H (u)m ∈ G. Let psk← (u,m). Return psk,p.
• ServerPunch(sk, pk,p) → p′,pi : Compute p′ ← psk as well
as the proof of knowledge pi ← ZKPK{(sk), pk = дsk,p′ =
psk}. Output p′,pi .
• ClientPunch(pk, psk,p,p′,pi ) → psk′,p′′ or ⊥: First, ver-
ify the proof pi . If verication fails, output ⊥. Otherwise,
begin by interpreting psk as (u,m). en sample a new ran-
dom masking valuem′ ←R Zq and compute p′′ ← (p′)m′/m .
Set psk′ ← (u,m′), and output psk′,p′′.
• ClientRedeem(psk,p) → psk′,p′: Begin by interpreting
psk as (u,m) with u ∈ {0, 1}λ andm ∈ Zq . en compute
p′ ← p1/m ∈ G. Return u (as psk′) and p′.
• ServerVerify(sk, pk,DB, psk,p,n) → 1/0,DB′: Check
whether p = H (psk)skn and whether psk ∈ DB. If the
rst check returns true and the second returns false, insert
psk into DB and return 1,DB. Otherwise, return 0,DB.
Observe that the asymptotic complexity of almost every op-
eration in our punch card scheme depends only on the security
parameter λ, with two exceptions. e rst excpetion is that opera-
tions on DB have amortized time complexity O(λ), but in the worst
case a read/write to DB could depend on the number of previously
redeemed punch cards. e other exception is the exponentiation
skn performed in ServerVerify, where O(logn) group operations
are required. However, since the same n is oen used for every
punch card in practice, the server could precompute skn to remove
the logarithmic dependence on n.
3.2 Security
We now discuss the security of our constructions. We begin by
proving the privacy of our punch card scheme.
Theorem 3.1. Assuming the existential soundness of the Chaum-
Pedersen proof system, our punch card scheme has privacy (Deni-
tion 2.2) in the random oracle model.
Proof. We begin by describing the simulator S = (S1,S2,S3).
• S1(1λ) → p: is simulator samples and outputs a random
group element p ←R G.
• S2(pk,p,p′,pi ) → p′′/⊥: is simulator veries the proof
pi that p, pk,p′ form a DDH tuple and outputs ⊥ if veri-
cation fails. Otherwise, it samples and outputs a random
group element p′′ ←R G.
• S3(sk, cid) → psk′,p′: is simulator samples a random
string psk′ ←R {0, 1}λ and computes p′ ← H (psk′)skcid . It
outputs psk′,p′.
Next, we show through a short series of hybrids that
REALPRIV(λ,A) ≈c IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S) for our punch card
scheme.
H0: is hybrid is the real privacy experiment
REALPRIV(λ,A).
H1: In this hybrid, we add an abort condition to the execution
of the experiment. e experiment aborts and outputs 0 if
S2 outputs p′′ , ⊥ (i.e., it accepts the proof pi ) but it is not
the case that pk = дsk ∧ p′ = psk.
is hybrid is indistinguishable from H0 by the sound-
ness of the Chaum-Pedersen proof system. In particular, an
adversary A who can distinguish between H0 and H1 can
be used by an algorithm B to break the soundness of the
proof system as follows. B plays the role of the adversary
in the soundness game for the Chaum-Pedersen proof, and
plays the role of the challenger to A in either H0 or H1
with probability 1/2 each. WheneverA causes experiment
H1 to abort due to the check introduced in this hybrid, B
submits the proof pi and the statement pk = дsk ∧ p′ = psk
to the soundness challenger. Otherwise, B outputs ⊥.
e algorithm B described above breaks the soundness
of the Chaum-Pedersen proof with the same advantage
that A distinguishes between H0 and H1. To see why,
observe that the only dierence in the view of A between
H0 and H1 occurs when H1 aborts. us A must cause
the experiment to abort with probability at least equal
to its distinguishing advantage between H0 and H1. But
whenever H1 aborts, B has a statement and proof that
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violate the soundness of the Chaum-Pedersen proof, so it
wins the soundness game with the same advantage.
H2: In this hybrid, the challenger switches to record-keeping
in the table T in the way IDEALPRIV does and replaces
calls to Issue, ClientPunch, and ClientRedeem with calls
to S1, S2, and S3, respectively.
is hybrid is indistinguishable from H1 because the
distribution of the adversary A’s view is identical in the
two hybrids. We will establish this by considering the
oracles Oissue, Opunch, and Oredeem one at a time.
– Oissue() → c,p: In H1, the value p returned by this
oracle is determined by m ←R Zq ,u ←R {0, 1}λ ,p ←
H (u)m ∈ G, which, since H is modeled as a random
oracle, corresponds to a uniformly random element of
G . In H2, the value p is directly chosen as a uniformly
random element p ←R G. In both hybrids, c is simply
the next value of a counter that is incremented with
each query. us the distribution of the output of the
oracle is identical across the two hybrids.
– Opunch(id,p′,pi ) → p′′/⊥: In both H1 and H2, the
oracle veries pi and outputs ⊥ if verication fails
(and the game aborts if verication succeeds for a false
statement). us we only need to consider cases where
the proof veries, i.e., when pk = дsk ∧ p′ = psk. In
this case, H1 selects a randomm′ ←R Zq and outputs
p′′ ← (p′)m′/m ∈ G, which is distributed uniformly
at random in G. In H2, the value of p′′ is directly
chosen as a uniformly random value p′′ ←R G. us
the distribution of the output of the oracle is identical
across the two hybrids.
– Oredeem(id) → psk′,p′: In H1, this oracle returns the
secret u used to generate the punch card stored at
T [id] as well as the value of that punch card p aer
removing the last maskm to getp′ ← p1/m . e value
ofu is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}λ . e
value of p′ is equal to H (u) raised to the server secret
sk as many times as there was a successful call to
Opunch(id, ·, ·) – that is, a call whose output was not
⊥. is is the case because in each such call, the
punch card value stored in T is raised to sk and its
mask is replaced with a new one. e nal unmasking
operation p′ ← p1/m results in a punch card value
p′ = H (u)skn , where n is the number of successful
calls to Opunch(id, ·, ·).
In H2, u clearly has the same distribution as in H1
because in S3 it is sampled directly as u ←R {0, 1}λ .
e value p′ also has the same distribution as in H1
because the tableT gradually keeps count of the num-
ber cid of successful calls to Opunch(id, ·, ·), so S3 can
compute p′ ←R H (u)skcid directly.
H3: is hybrid is identical to H2 except the abort condition
introduced inH1 is removed. As was the case inH1, this hy-
brid is indistinguishable from the preceding hybrid by the
soundness of the Chaum-Pedersen proof system. It also cor-
responds to the ideal privacy game IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S),
completing the proof.

Having proven privacy, we now turn to soundness. We prove the
soundness of our scheme in the algebraic group model (AGM) [23],
where for every group element the adversary produces, it must also
give a representation of that group element in terms of elements it
has already seen. is is a strictly weaker model (in the sense that
it puts fewer restrictions on the adversary) than the widely-used
generic group model [38], in which some of the prior works on
privacy-preserving loyalty programs have been proven secure [5, 6].
Our proof relies on the q-discrete log assumption, which assumes
the computational hardness of winning the following game.
Denition 3.2 (q-discrete log game). e q-discrete log game for
a group G of prime order p is played between a challenger C and
an adversary A. e challenger C samples x ←R Zp and sends
дx ,дx
2
, ...,дx
q to A. e adversary A responds with a value z ∈
Zp , and the challenger outputs 1 i z = x .
Depending on the concrete group in which the assumption is
made, theq-discrete log game could be vulnerable to Brown-Gallant-
Cheon aacks [10, 18], which reduce the security of the assumption
by a factor of √q. Fortunately this aack only negligibly aects the
security of the scheme, as q is at most a polynomial in the security
parameter λ.
We now state and prove our soundness theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Assuming the zero-knowledge property of the
Chaum-Pedersen proof system and the q-discrete log assumption inG ,
our punch card scheme has soundness (Denition 2.3) in the algebraic
group model with random oracles.
Proof. Since q already refers to the order of the group G, we
will refer to the N -discrete log assumption throughout this proof.
e high-level idea of the proof is to program random oracle queries
with re-randomizations of powers of дx given by the N -discrete log
challenger. en, whenever a punch card is given by the adversary,
the algebraic adversary must also give a representation of the punch
card p in terms of group elements it has seen before. As such, the
challenger can pick out the дx i component and replace it with дx i+1
in its response. en a punch card that is accepted before receiving
n punches must include a second representation of дxn , allowing
us to solve for x .
We now formalize the proof idea sketched above. Our proof
proceeds through a series of hybrids.
H0: is hybrid is the soundness experiment SOUND(λ,A).
H1: In this hybrid, we replace the proof pi output by Opunch
with a simulated proof.
e the zero-knowledge property of the Chaum-
Pedersen proof guarantees that the proof can be simulated.
Since hybrids H0 and H1 are identical save for the real
proof in H0 and the simulated proof in H1, the output of
an adversaryA who distinguishes betweenH0 andH1 can
also be used to distinguish between a real and simulated
proof with the same advantage.
H2: In this hybrid, we add an abort condition to the execution
of the experiment. e experiment aborts and outputs 0 if
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the Oredeem(psk,p,n) oracle ever outputs b = 1 when it re-
ceives a value of psk that the adversary has not previously
queried from the random oracle H .
is hybrid is indistinguishable from H1 because
the probability of an adversary successfully triggering
this abort condition is negligible in λ and there are no
other dierences between H1 and H2. In order for the
Oredeem oracle to output b = 1, it must be the case that
ServerVerify(sk, pk,DB, psk,p,n) outputs 1, which means
that p = H (psk)skn . But since H is modeled as a random
function andH (psk) has not been queried before, its output
is chosen uniformly at random in G, that is, H (psk) ←R G.
But thenH (psk)skn is also distributed uniformly at random
in G, and the probability Pr[p = H (psk)skn ] ≤ negl(λ).
H3: In this hybrid, we modify how the challenger computes the
output of ServerPunch(sk, pk,p) and of the random oracle
H . Recall that since A is an algebraic adversary, every
group element it sends is accompanied by a representa-
tion in terms of the previous group elements it has seen:
the generator д, returned punch cards p′1, ...,p
′
Q for the
Q queries it has made to the Opunch oracle, and random
oracle outputsH1, ...,HQ ′ for theQ ′ random oracle queries
it has made.
Let дi = дsk
i
for i ∈ Z. Whenever the adversary A
makes a call to the oracleH on a previously unqueried point
u, the challenger samples r ←R Zq and sets H (u) ← дr1 .
Since r is distributed uniformly at random in Zq , so isH (u).
Next, wheneverA makes a call to the oracle Opunch(p),
instead of seing p′ ← psk, the challenger looks at the
algebraic representation of p submied by A and replaces
each occurence of дi with дi+1, including replacing д with
д1. Since the only elements A has seen are д, random
oracle outputs, and the previous results of Opunch, the
challenger can keep track of which elements contain which
дi as it sends them to A. e outputs of Opunch(p) in H3
are identical to the outputs in H2, because the process
described here results in the same group element p′ that
would be represented by psk.
Since all the changes in H3 result in identically dis-
tributed outputs as in H2, the two hybrids are indistin-
guishable.
From H3, we can prove that any algebraic adversary A who
wins the soundness game can be used by an algorithm B, described
below, to break the N -discrete log assumption in G. Algorithm B
plays the role of the adversary in the N -discrete log game while
simultaneously playing the role of the challenger in H3. Algorithm
B simulates H3 exactly to A, except that it uses the N -discrete
log challenge messages дx ,дx 2 , ...,дxN as the values of дi . at is,
дi = д
x i . Moreover, it sets pk ← д1 in the setup phase. Observe
that the дi are distributed identically as in H3, so this is a perfect
simulation of H3 with x playing the role of sk. e value of N
required in the assumption depends on the maximum number of
sequential punches A requests on the same group element.
Now, if A wins the soundness game, it means that credeem >
cpunch. is, in turn, implies that there was some successful punch
card redemption ServerVerify where the accepted value of p had
not been previously punched n times, i.e., the representation of p
does not contain дn+1. But since successful verication requires
that p = H (psk)xn = (дr1 )x
n
= дrn+1, and the algebraic adversaryA must give a representation of p, we now have two dierent
representations of дn+1 = дx
n+1 , which together yield a degree-
n+1 equation in x . is equation can be solved for x using standard
techniques [39], allowing B to recover x and win the N -discrete
log game. 
4 MERGING PUNCH CARDS
Having described our main construction, we now consider another
feature sometimes enjoyed by physical punch cards that we may
want to reproduce digitally: merging partially-lled cards. Just as
in real life, it is possible to “merge” two punch cards by redeeming
them separately and taking into account the sum of the number of
punches across the two cards. However, this process reveals the
number of punches held by each card at redemption time, informa-
tion that the customer may want to hide. We can hide the value of
the two cards being merged by resorting to pairings.
Denition 4.1 (Pairings [7]). LetG0,G1,GT be three cyclic groups
of prime order q where д0 ∈ G0 and д1 ∈ G1 are generators. A
pairing is an eciently computable function e : G0 × G1 → GT
satisfying the following properties:
• Bilinear: for all u,u ′ ∈ G0 and v,v ′ ∈ G1 we have
e(u · u ′,v) = e(u,v) · e(u ′,v)
and
e(u,v · v ′) = e(u,v) · e(u,v ′)
• Non-degenerate: дT ← e(д0,д1) is a generator of GT .
When G0 = G1, we say that the pairing is a symmetric pairing.
We refer to G0 and G1 as the pairing groups and refer to GT as the
target group.
Using a symmetric pairing, we can quite simply merge two punch
cards without revealing the number of punches on each. Before re-
deeming punch cards p0 and p1 which have i and j punches, respec-
tively, with i + j = n, the client computes p ← e(p0,p1). To redeem
a merged card, the client sends the server the merged punch card p
along with u0 and u1, the secrets for the two punch cards merged
into p. e server checks that e(H (u0)skn ,H (u1)). e bilinear prop-
erty of the pairing ensures that e
(
p0,p1
)
= e
(
H (u0)ski ,H (u1)skj
)
=
e
(
H (u0)skn ,H (u1)
)
. We can even hide whether or not a redeemed
punch card is merged by generating a fresh punch card before
redemption and merging a complete card with it.
e performance of symmetric pairings is far worse than that of
asymmetric pairings, so we would like to have a scheme that works
for asymmetric pairings as well. Unfortunately, directly converting
the idea above to asymmetric pairings meets with some diculties.
Since each punch card must belong to either G0 or G1, we can only
merge pairs of cards where p0 ∈ G0 and p1 ∈ G1. But this is a
decision that must be made when a card is rst issued, restricting
punch cards to being merged with cards that belong to the other
pairing group.
We resolve this problem by spliing each punch card into two
components, one in each pairing group. Each component behaves
as a punch card in the original scheme. Generating a punch card is
7
similar to the original scheme, but the secret u ←R {0, 1}λ is hashed
by two dierent functions H0 : {0, 1}λ → G0 and H1 : {0, 1}λ →
G1. Each hole punch repeats the punch protocol of the original
scheme twice, once inG0 and once inG1. Redeeming a card requires
merging the G0 and G1 components of the two cards with each
other as above, and since the client has a version of each punch
card in both groups, it can merge them as before.
We formalize this sketch of a solution below. We replace the
ClientRedeem algorithm from our punch card syntax with a new
ClientMergeRedeem algorithm that merges two punch cards before
redeeming them.
Construction 2 (Mergable Punch Card Scheme). Let G0,G1,GT
be groups of prime order q with generators д0 ∈ G0,д1 ∈ G1, and
let H0,H1 be hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G0,H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
modeled as random oracles. We construct our punch card scheme as
follows:
• ServerSetup(1λ) → sk, pk,DB: Select random sk ←R Zq
and set pk0 ← дsk0 ∈ G0, pk1 ← дsk1 ∈ G1. Initialize DB as
an empty hash table, and return sk, pk = (pk0, pk1), and
DB.
• Issue(1λ) → psk,p: First, select a random secret u ←R
{0, 1}λ and random masking valuesm0 ←R Zq ,m1 ←R Zq .
en compute p0 ← H0(u)m0 ∈ G0,p1 ← H1(u)m1 ∈ G1.
Let psk← (u,m0,m1). Return psk,p = (p0,p1).
• ServerPunch(sk, pk,p) → p′,pi : First, interpret pk as
(pk0, pk1) and p as (p0,p1). Compute p′0 ← psk0 ,p′1 ← psk1
as well as the proofs of knowledge pi0 ← ZKPK{(sk), pk0 =
дsk0 ,p
′
0 = p
sk
0 } and pi1 ← ZKPK{(sk), pk1 = дsk1 ,p′1 = psk1 }.
Output p′ = (p′0,p′1),pi = (pi0,pi1).
• ClientPunch(pk, psk,p,p′,pi ) → psk′,p′′or⊥: First, inter-
pret psk as (u,m0,m1), p as (p0,p1), p′ as (p′0,p′1), and
pi as (pi0,pi1) . Next, verify the proofs pi0 and pi1. If ei-
ther verication fails, output ⊥. en sample new ran-
dom masking values m′0 ←R Zq ,m′1 ←R Zq and com-
pute p′′0 ← (p′0)m
′
0/m0 ,p′′1 ← (p
′m′1/m1
1 ). Finally, output
psk′ = (u,m′0,m′1),p′′ = (p′′0 ,p′′1 ).
• ClientMergeRedeem(psk,p, psk′,p′) → psk′′,p′′: Begin
by interpreting psk as (u,m0,m1), psk′ as (u ′,m′0,m′1),
p as (p0,p1), and p′ as (p′0,p′1). en compute p′′ ←
e(p1/m00 , (p′1)1/m
′
1 ) ∈ GT . Return psk′′ = (u,u ′) and p′′.
• ServerVerify(sk, pk,DB, psk,p,n) → 1/0,DB′: Begin by in-
terpreting psk as (u,u ′). en perform the following checks:
(1) p = e(H0(u)skn ,H1(u ′))
(2) u ∈ DB
(3) u ′ ∈ DB
If the rst check returns true and the other checks return
false, insert u and u ′ into DB and return 1,DB. Otherwise,
return 0,DB.
Although not included in our formal construction, our scheme
could be extended to allow more punches to occur on a merged
card so long as the client indicates that it is a merged card being
punched and the punch/proof occur over elements inGT . Note that
this scheme only allows for two punch cards to merged. Our general
strategy for merging punch cards could be extended to more than
two cards using multilinear maps [8, 19, 24], but a construction
that allows merging of more than two cards while only relying on
ecient standard primitives would require new techniques. is is
an interesting problem for future work to address.
We now state and prove our security theorems for the mer-
gable punch card scheme. e only change required in the se-
curity games to account for the change from ClientRedeem to
ClientMergeRedeem is that the redeem oracle in the privacy game
takes in two ids instead of just one and passes both corresponding
punch cards to ClientMergeRedeem.
Theorem 4.2. Assuming the existential soundness of the Chaum-
Pedersen proof system, our mergable punch card scheme has privacy
in the random oracle model.
Proof (sketch). We begin by describing the simulator S =
(S1,S2,S3).
• S1(1λ) → p: is simulator samples and outputs two
random group elements p0 ←R G0 and p1 ←R G1.
• S2(pk,p,p′,pi ) → p′′/⊥: is simulator interprets pi =
(pi0,pi1) and veries both proofs, outpuing ⊥ if either
verication fails. Otherwise, it samples and outputs two
random group elements p′′0 ←R G0 and p′′1 ←R G1.
• S3(sk, cid, cid′) → psk′,p′: is simulator samples two
random strings u ←R {0, 1}λ ,u ′ ←R {0, 1}λ and computes
p′ ← e(H0(u)skcid ,H1(u ′)skcid′ ). It outputs psk ← (u,u ′)
and p′.
Next, we show through a short series of hybrids that
REALPRIV(λ,A) ≈c IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S) for our mergable punch
card scheme. e rest of proof of this theorem is very similar to
that of eorem 3.1. e main dierence is that the soundness of
the Chaum-Pedersen proof system needs to be invoked separately
in each of G0 and G1. us we only sketch the steps of the hybrid
argument below.
H0: is hybrid is the real privacy experiment
REALPRIV(λ,A).
H1: In this hybrid, we add an abort condition to the execution
of the experiment. e experiment aborts and outputs 0
if S2 outputs p′′ , ⊥ (i.e., it accepts the proofs pi0 and pi1)
but it is not the case that pk0 = дsk0 ∧ p′0 = psk0 .
H2: In this hybrid, we add an abort condition to the execution
of the experiment. e experiment aborts and outputs 0
if S2 outputs p′′ , ⊥ (i.e., it accepts the proofs pi0 and pi1)
but it is not the case that pk1 = дsk1 ∧ p′1 = psk1 .
H3: In this hybrid, the challenger switches to record-keeping
in the table T in the way IDEALPRIV does and replaces
calls to Issue, ClientPunch, and ClientMergeRedeem with
calls to S1, S2, and S3, respectively.
H4: is hybrid is identical to H3 except the abort condition
introduced in H2 is removed.
H5: is hybrid is identical to H4 except the abort condition
introduced in H1 is removed. It also corresponds to the
ideal privacy game IDEALPRIV(λ,A,S), completing the
proof.

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Next, we prove the soudness of our scheme. Since our new
scheme uses pairings, we use an asymmetric q-discrete log assump-
tion, which assumes the computational hardness of winning the
following game.
Denition 4.3 (asymmetric q-discrete log game). e q-discrete
log game for groups G0,G1 of prime order p is played between a
challenger C and an adversary A. e challenger C samples x ←R
Zp and sends дx0 ,д
x 2
0 , ...,д
xq
0 ,д
x
1 ,д
x 2
1 , ...,д
xq
1 to A. e adversaryA responds with a value z ∈ Zp , and the challenger outputs 1 i
z = x .
Theorem 4.4. Assuming the zero-knowledge property of the
Chaum-Pedersen proof system and the asymmetric q-discrete log
assumption inG0 andG1, our mergable punch card scheme has sound-
ness (Denition 2.3) in the algebraic group model with random oracles.
Proof (sketch). Since q already refers to the order of the
groups G0,G1,GT , we will refer to the asymmetric N -discrete log
assumption throughout this proof. e majority of proof of this
theorem is very similar to that of eorem 3.3. e main dierence
in the hybrids is that several hybrids need to be repeated to account
for each punch card being made up of two group elements instead
of one. us we only sketch the steps of the hybrid argument below
and focus on the last step of the argument.
H0: is hybrid is the soundness experiment SOUND(λ,A).
H1: In this hybrid, we replace the proof pi0 output by Opunch
with a simulated proof.
H2: In this hybrid, we replace the proof pi1 output by Opunch
with a simulated proof.
H3: In this hybrid, we add an abort condition to the execution
of the experiment. e experiment aborts and outputs 0
if the Oredeem(psk,p,n) oracle ever outputs b = 1 when
it receives a value of u or u ′ that the adversary has not
previously queried from both random oracles H0 and H1.
H4: In this hybrid, we modify how the challenger computes the
output of ServerPunch(sk, pk,p) and of the random oracle
H . Let д0,i = дsk
i
0 and д1,i = д
ski
1 for i ∈ Z. Recall that
since A is an algebraic adversary, every group element
it sends is accompanied by a representation in terms of
the previous group elements it has seen. Just as we did
in the proof of eorem 3.3, instead of punching cards by
raising psk0 and p
sk
1 , we examine the algebraic representa-
tion of p0,p1 submied by the adversary and replace each
instance of д0,i or д1,i with д0,i+1 or д1,i+1, respectively.
Also, whenever the adversary A makes a call to the ora-
cles Hj (for j ∈ 0, 1) on a previously unqueried point u, the
challenger samples r ←R Zq and sets Hj (u) ← дrj,1.
From H4, we can prove that any algebraic adversary A who
wins the soundness game can be used by an algorithm B, described
below, to break the N -discrete log assumption in either G0 or G1.
Algorithm B plays the role of the adversary in the asymmetric
N -discrete log game while simultaneously playing the role of the
challenger in H4. Algorithm B simulates H4 exactly to A, ex-
cept that it uses the asymmetric N -discrete log challenge messages
дx0 ,д
x 2
0 , ...,д
xN
0 ,д
x
1 ,д
x 2
1 , ...,д
xN
1 as the values of д0,i and д1,i . at
is, д0,i = дx
i
0 and д1,i = д
x i
1 . Moreover, it sets pk← (д0,1,д1,1) in
the setup phase. Observe that all д0,i and д1,i are distributed iden-
tically as in H4, so this is a perfect simulation of H4 with x playing
the role of sk. e value of N required in the assumption depends
on the maximum number of sequential punches A requests on the
same group element.
Now, if A wins the soundness game, it means that credeem >
cpunch. is, in turn, implies that there was some successful punch
card redemption ServerVerify where the accepted value ofp had not
been previously punched n times between the two merged cards.
Let a and b the number of times each of the two merged cards had
been punched before redemption, so we have a + b < n.
e successful verication requires that
p = e(H1(u)xn ,H2(u ′)) = e(дrxn0,1 ,дr
′
1,1) = e(дrx
a′
0,1 ,д
r ′xb′
1,1 )
for any a′,b ′ where a′ + b ′ = n, and the algebraic adversary must
give a representation of p (it can include a pairing in this represen-
tation). It must be true that one of a′ or b ′ is greater than a or b,
respectively, because a + b < n. us the representation of p must
not include either дr0,a′+1 or д
r ′
1,b′+1 because one of those values will
not have been given to A. is means we now have two dierent
representations of one of these elements, which together yield a
degree a′ + 1 or b ′ + 1 equation in x . is equation can be solved
for x using standard techniques [39], allowing B to recover x and
win the asymmetric N -discrete log game. 
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented our main punch card scheme from Section 3 as
well as the mergable punch card scheme from Section 4. Our imple-
mentation is wrien in Rust with a Java wrapper to run the Rust
code on Android devices. e implementation of the main punch
card scheme relies on the curve25519-dalek [33] crate which im-
plements curve25519 [4], and the mergable punch card scheme uses
the pairing-plus [25] crate, which provides an implementation of
BLS12-381 curves [9]. Our implementation and raw evaluation data
are available at hps://github.com/SabaEskandarian/PunchCard.
We carried out our evaluation with the client running on a
Google Pixel (rst generation) phone and the server running on
a laptop with an Intel i5-8265U processor @ 1.60GHz. All data
reported on our scheme comes from an average of at least 100 trials.
ServerVerify was run with n = 10 punches on each redeemed punch
card and an empty database DB of used cards. We repeated the test
of the main scheme with a database of 1,000,000 used cards and saw
no signicant dierence between that and the test with an empty
database, leading us to conclude that the hash table lookup does
not dominate the cost of the ServerVerify algorithm.
Figure 1 shows the running time of each of the algorithms in
our main punch card construction as well as the amount of in-
protocol data sent by the party running the algorithm in a punch
card system. e data sent in ServerSetup refers to the size of the
public key which must be communicated to clients. Observe that
we do not require the client to communicate any data in order for a
new punch card to be issued. e most costly operation, punching a
card, requires less than 5ms between the client and server combined,
and all other operations require less than 1ms. Commmunication
is under 200 Bytes for all operations.
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ServerSetup Issue ServerPunch ClientPunch ClientRedeem ServerVerify
Computation Time (ms) 0.019 0.304 0.134 4.314 0.890 0.064
Data Sent (Bytes) 32 0 128 32 64 0
Table 1: Computation and communication costs for our main punch card scheme.
ServerSetup Issue ServerPunch ClientPunch ClientMergeRedeem ServerVerify
Computation Time (ms) 1.09 34.97 4.33 137.79 36.43 4.00
Data Sent (Bytes) 144 0 496 144 640 0
Table 2: Computation and communication costs for our mergable punch card scheme using pairings.
Figure 2 shows the same information for the mergable punch
card scheme. e mergable scheme runs considerably more slowly
than the main scheme. is is the result of 1) more work being
required in the mergable scheme, 2) group operations being more
costly in pairing groups, and 3) the heavily optimized library used
for curve25519 (curve25519-dalek) in the implementation of the
main scheme. Group elements in pairing groups are also larger
than in curve25519. In curve25519, the size of a group element
д ∈ G is 32 Bytes, but in the BLS12-381 curves, д0 ∈ G0 requires 48
Bytes, д1 ∈ G1 requires 96 Bytes, and дT ∈ GT requires 576 Bytes.
Comparison to prior work. We compare our punch card scheme
to the loyalty systems BBA+ [28], UACS [5], and Bobolz et al. [6].
We do not compare to the original BBA work [29] because its per-
formance is strictly worse than the works to which we do compare.
We use the performance numbers reported by each prior work. Per-
formance numbers for UACS and Bobolz et al., were also recorded
with a Google Pixel phone but used a computer with a stronger
i7 processor. BBA+ only reports the client-side cost of each of its
protocols and uses a OnePlus 3 phone. In order to beer capture
the total cost of using each approach, we combine client and server
costs to give the overall computation cost of each scheme. However,
the distribution of cost between the client and server is similar for
all works, with the mobile device incurring most of the computation
cost.
Figure 3 compares the performance numbers of our schemes
against those of prior work. Our main scheme issues a card 282.99×
faster than the best prior work (UACS), punches a card 14.4× faster
than the best prior work (Bobolz et al.), and redeems a card 393.8×
faster than the best prior work (BBA+). Although each prior work
we compared to was the fastest in one of these three procedures,
our scheme strictly dominates all of them by at least an order of
magnitude. e performance improvement comes from removing
the reliance on pairings and signicantly reducing the number and
complexity of zero knowledge proofs required in each operation.
Our mergable punch card scheme outperforms prior work in
almost every category, and by a margin of 9.3× in card redemption.
e Bobolz et al. scheme punches a card about twice as fast as
our scheme, but they achieve this by removing zero knowledge
proofs from the punch protocol and pushing them to redemption,
which takes over a second (our redemption is 31× faster). An
important dierence to point out between our implementation and
prior work is that while our implementation was done with BLS12-
381 curves, which provide 128 bits of security, prior works all used
BN curves [1, 30] that only provide 100 bits of security [31, 37].
Figure 4 compares the communication costs of our schemes with
BBA+, the only prior work to report the communication costs in-
curred by their implementation. Unlike all prior work, our scheme
requires no communication to issue a new card, and card punching
and redemption require 25.3× and 62.3× less communication, re-
spectively, than BBA+. For the mergable scheme, the improvements
are reduced to about 6×, but even this scheme requires signicantly
less communication.
6 EXTENSIONS
We now briey discuss extensions to our main punch card scheme
that can allow it to be used in a wider variety of applications.
Multi-punches. Some loyalty programs sometimes oer extra
punches on their punch cards as a special promotion. Others don’t
use a punch card at all, opting instead for a system where dierent
transactions earn varying numbers of points. Our punch card
scheme can easily be extended to handle these situations by having
the server raise p to skt , where t is the number of points being
awarded for a given transaction.
Unfortunately, this kind of multi-punch raises a new security
question. Most punch card schemes oer a xed value n at which
point a card can be redeemed for some benet, or perhaps a few
values at which dierent kinds of rewards are unlocked. But the
possibility of gaining more than one punch with a given transaction
introduces the potential for a client to “overshoot” the required
number of points. is does not pose an issue for functionality,
because the client can just redeem a card with n′ > n punches and
perhaps even get a new card with the remaining balance. However,
this might introduce a privacy issue because the redemption reveals
the total number of punches on a card, which is no longer always the
exact same value for all clients. One way to eliminate this problem
is to have the server send all possible values psk,psk
2
, ...,psk
t
when
punching a card. is works well for seings where t is small, e.g.,
a double-punch promotion. We leave the problem of an ecient
solution for large t for future work.
Managing used card database size. Our punch card scheme re-
quires keeping a database DB of used punch card secrets u, stored
in a hash table in our implementation. While this does not pose
a performance problem because of the amortized constant time
lookup in the hash table, the storage cost increases over time. Al-
though at 128 bits per secret, it would take a long time for storage
costs to become prohibitive, a high-volume punch card program
may wish for a plan to eventually remove old punch cards from the
database without allowing double spending.
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Issuing a Card Punching a Card Redeeming a Card
BBA+ scheme 115.27 385.61 375.73
UACS scheme 86 127 454
Bobolz et al. scheme 130 64 1254
Our main scheme 0.304 (282.99× faster) 4.448 (14.4× faster) 0.954 (393.8× faster)
Our mergable scheme 34.97 (2.5× faster) 142.12 40.43 (9.3× faster)
Table 3: Computation time (inmilliseconds) for our schemes and priorwork. Speedups shown in parentheses
refer to improvement over best prior work.
Issuing a Card Punching a Card Redeeming a Card
BBA+ scheme 992 4048 3984
Our main scheme 0 160 (25.3× reduction) 64 (62.3× reduction)
Our mergable scheme 0 640 (6.3× reduction) 640 (6.2× reduction)
Table 4: Communication (in Bytes) in our schemes and BBA+ [28], the only prior work to record commu-
nication costs. Our schemes incur no communication to issue a new card and achieve order of magnitude
improvements for other operations. e pairing-based scheme requires more communication because pair-
ing group elements are larger and punching a card requires twice as many elements communicated.
One way to help reduce the long-term storage requirement is
by adding extra information into the secret u. Since u is ultimately
passed through a hash function modeled as a random oracle, adding
structured information before the random bits makes no dierence
in the security of the scheme (unless the structured information
itself leaks something). Clients can be required to add an expiration
date to the beginning of u. en the card redemption would check
whether the card being used is expired or not. To encourage clients
to pick reasonable expiration dates, cards with expiration dates too
far in the future could be rejected as well. Expiration dates used
in u could be standardized, e.g., to the rst day of a given year, to
prevent the date itself from leaking too much information about an
individual customer’s shopping habits.
Private ticketing. Our punch card scheme can also be viewed as
a scheme for private ticketing, or, more generally, as a one-time use
anonymous credential. To issue a ticket, the client generates a new
punch card, and the server punches it. A ticket can reect additional
information (e.g., if a train ticket is rst class or coach, which transit
zones a ticket is valid for, etc.) by the number of punches added to
the ticket. To record multiple pieces of information on the same
ticket, the random oracle H can be used to generate multiple group
elements from u, each of which can hold a dierent number of
punches. Since the punches cannot be linked to their redemption, a
client can later present the ticket without linking it to the issuance
process.
7 CONCLUSION
We have presented a new scheme for punch card loyalty programs
that signicantly outperforms all prior work both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Our scheme does not require any server interaction
for a client to receive a punch card, does not require pairings, and
outperforms prior work in card issuance, punching, and redemp-
tion by 283×, 14.4×, and 394× respectively, strictly dominating the
performance of all prior solutions to this problem. We have also
shown several extensions to our main scheme, including a modied
protocol that allows merging punch cards (using pairings) that still
outperforms prior work. Our implementation is open source and
available at hps://github.com/SabaEskandarian/PunchCard.
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